Gage was expert at this task, which he had performed many times. One day, after the fuse had been placed, but before sand had been poured in the hole, someone called to Gage. Distracted, he dropped the bar into the hole, igniting the fuse and the powder. The resulting explosion launched the bar like a rocket upward into Gage's face. The bar penetrated his left cheek, went through the top of his skull and landed a 100 or so feet away, covered with blood and portions of Gage's brain. Still conscious, Gage was taken to a nearby doctor. Miraculously, he survived. Even without antibiotics he fought off infection and eventually the hole in his skull healed. In less than two months, Gage's doctors pronounced him "cured." While Gage's wounds had healed, and he could walk, talk and use his hands like any normal man, he was hardly his old self. In fact, he was a new person, one so different that "Emotion, feeling and biological regulation all play a role in human reason." "The body contributes more than life support and modulatory effects to the brain. It contributes a content that is part and parcel of the workings of the normal mind."
his employers refused to take him back. Friends noted that "Gage was no longer Gage." This new Gage could not manage his emotions. He was fi tful, irreverent and profane. He was impatient and acted on his desires without restraint. At times, he was stubborn and yet, at other times, he could not make up his mind. He couldn't plan for the future. He went from job to job, sometimes getting fi red, sometimes quitting capriciously. He traveled and joined the circus as a freak, posing with the iron bar from his accident. Finally, he ended up living with his mother and sister as their dependent. In 1861, at age 38, he died during a seizure. What had happened to this once capable, temperate man who seemed from the outside to have healed from his horrifi c wounds?
Researchers found the answer in the early 1990s after creating computer simulations of Gage's skull. They learned that the accident had damaged a specifi c part of Gage's brain, the prefrontal cortex. They concluded that this damage impaired his ability to plan and make decisions. Researchers tested this conclusion by examining other patients with similar prefrontal cortex damage. One such patient, known as "Elliot," had parts of his prefrontal cortex removed because of a brain tumor. Much like Gage, Elliot recovered from surgery. He seemed largely as he had always been: charming, informed about current events and intelligent with an excellent memory, a good sense of humor and strong business skills.
But Elliot was unable to function. He couldn't prepare for work. Once on the job, he couldn't manage his schedule. He got distracted easily, sometimes spending far too much time on an irrelevant task, other times unable to decide on which task he should focus. Like Gage, Elliot could not hold a job. Instead, he pursued reckless business ventures, ignoring the warnings of family and friends. Ultimately divorced and penurious, he drifted without an inner compass, unable to make the simple, self-interested decisions most people make daily without hesitation. Researchers then reviewed the literature and found similar cases, one from 1932 and one from 1948. In both cases, the patients apparently had either damaged or nonexistent prefrontal cortices; in both cases, they couldn't plan and they made self-defeating decisions.
The Prefrontal Cortex
The prefrontal cortex is a strip of gray matter several millimeters thick that sits at the front of the brain just above the orbits of the eyes. It plays a special role among the brain's many systems, which are highly interrelated or "loopy." Signals from all the brain's sensory regions go to the prefrontal cortex, including signals from the sensory regions that monitor past and present states of the body. The brain's many bio-regulatory areas also send signals to the prefrontal cortex, such as the areas that regulate the neurotransmitters, serotonin and dopamine. The prefrontal cortex also is involved in classifying experiences as either (roughly speaking) "good" or "bad" for the organism. Finally, it connects to the brain systems that control motor and chemical responses. Because of this, the prefrontal cortex is ideally constructed for reasoning about personal situations, precisely the kinds of tasks that were problems for Gage and Elliot.
The essence of reasoning is deciding among alternatives. Indeed, many scientists treat the terms "reasoning" and "deciding" as synonyms. To fi gure out choices, the brain collects knowledge, some actual and some hypothetical. This includes factual knowledge about the world "out there" beyond the brain, past experiences and the current state of the body. The brain then "considers" the options, meaning that it orders and ranks possibilities by some criteria, factoring in the consequences of the various alternatives. This type of reasoning, while similar to conscious deliberation, may occur entirely outside of awareness, resulting "For us, then, in the beginning it was being, and only later was it thinking." "We are, and then we think, and we think only inasmuch as we are, since thinking is indeed caused by the structures and operations of being." "Not all actions commanded by a brain are caused by deliberation. On the contrary, it is a fair assumption that most so-called brain-caused actions being taken at this very moment in the world are not deliberated at all." "There seem to be far more varieties of negative than positive emotions, and it is apparent that the brain handles positive and negative varieties of emotions with different systems." simply in a "gut feeling" that you ought to prefer a particular choice. Though it often occurs in the background, such reasoning is essential to normal human functioning.
Patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex are unable to engage in this kind of reasoning because one aspect of the system is missing. For instance, a patient with prefrontal damage had an appointment with researchers at an Iowa laboratory. It was winter. The patient drove to the lab on an icy road where cars had been sliding into ditches. Upon arrival, he told the researchers how he saw another driver skid. Instead of calmly turning the wheel in the proper direction to "drive out of the skid," that driver hit his brakes and went off the road. The patient coolly recounted the incident and mentioned that he drove on placidly and rationally, and didn't panic on the icy road. Unperturbed by emotion, he seemed to have an advantage over other drivers. But later, when he needed to schedule his next appointment at the lab, he had to choose between two dates a few days apart. He spent almost 30 minutes going through a tedious cost-benefi t analysis about which date was better, unable to choose. When the researchers fi nally tired of this and gave him a date, he accepted it without question. This patient, like Gage and Elliot, was missing the ability to produce "somatic markers" that allowed him to feel which alternative he should choose.
The Somatic-Marker Hypothesis
The term "somatic marker" comes from the Greek word "soma," meaning body, because the feelings that allow human beings to make decisions are bodily, in two ways. Often we feel emotions instinctively. Generally these emotions are associated with a bodily state (think of fear). The word "marker" is used because this gut feeling "marks" the chosen alternative, coloring it with a certain emotional hue so that it is more salient than the other alternatives. This is not to say that somatic markers are suffi cient for human decision making. Other forms of reasoning, often conscious, may work with them. However, somatic markers seem necessary to provide a kind of criterion for deciding.
Without an emotional "push" one way or the other, the patient got stuck in a loop when he tried to make his next appointment, continuing to deliberate "rationally" over a trivial decision. Somatic markers may also increase working memory and direct attention to certain alternatives. At the least, somatic markers seem to increase the effi ciency and, maybe, the accuracy of decision making by biasing the brain toward one alternative. Such "cognitive biases," while effective in many cases, also pose dangers. As psychologists and behavioral economists have shown, the average person's day-to-day reasoning is often quite faulty. The human mind is terrible at calculating probabilities and a vivid, dramatic image can dominate someone's mental landscape. For instance, a person may be quite scared of fl ying after picturing a plane full of screaming passengers dropping 6,000 feet out of the sky and exploding. Yet the same person may be quite comfortable traveling by car. The irony is that the odds of dying in a plane crash are far lower than the odds of dying on the freeway. Despite these limitations, the biases provided by somatic markers appear quite helpful, particularly in the social and interpersonal domains.
This picture of human reasoning is on the whole different from the "high-reason" view espoused by Plato, Descartes and Kant, as well as many of today's economists. According to this view, logic is the best and, perhaps, the only route to a personally benefi cial decision. People ideally make decisions by calculating the "subjective expected utility" of a variety of options after doing a cost-benefi t analysis. They depreciate losses and eliminate alternatives. For reason to prevail, people must keep emotion and feelings out of the decision-making process. However, if the somatic-marker hypothesis is correct for a large class of important decisions, Descartes' view is dead wrong.
"What we do not know, and it is improbable that we will ever know, is what 'absolute' reality is like." "While there is an external reality, what we know of it would come through the agency of the body proper in action, via representations of its perturbations. We would never know how faithful our knowledge is to 'absolute' reality." "The truly embodied mind I envision, however, does not relinquish its most refi ned levels of operation, those constituting its soul and spirit." "Perhaps the most indispensable thing we can do as human beings, every day of our lives, is remind ourselves and others of our complexity, fragility, fi niteness and uniqueness."
Testing the Hypothesis with the Iowa Gambling Task
Researchers devised an ingenious experiment to test the somatic marker hypothesis. Rather than using a dull, clinical task in a traditional lab setting, they designed an experiment that required life-like rational decision making: gambling. In one version, a subject (the "Player") was shown four decks of special cards, labeled A, B, C and D. The Player got a loan of $2,000 (in realistic play money) and was told to maximize his winnings as in real gambling. Play proceeded as the Player turned over cards one by one from any deck he wanted until the experimenter told him to stop. Winning cards paid various amounts (such as $50 or $100). Losing cards required the Player to pay the house.
Of course, unbeknownst to the Player, the game was rigged. The cards in decks A and B paid $100 and the cards in C and D paid $50. This suggested that A and B were better decks to use. However, the A and B decks had "stinger" cards requiring large payments to the house, sometimes up to $1,250 (recall that the Player started with only $2,000). Decks C and D also had stingers, but the sting had less venom: generally, the penalty was less than $100. Even the game's length was rigged. No matter how the Player played, the game lasted 100 turns. The Player was given no paper or other aids to help him calculate the best strategy.
Normal players -those without damage to the prefrontal cortex -started out by taking cards from various decks, looking for patterns. Early on they preferred high-paying decks A and B. But after around 30 turns they switched to C and D, and for the most part stayed there. Players with prefrontal cortex damage began the same way the "normals" did. But the frontally damaged patients stuck with the A and B decks even though the losing "stinger" cards in those decks forced them to pay so much to the house that they "went bankrupt" midway through the game and asked the researchers for fresh loans. The scientists ran further experiments measuring skin conductance responses during the gambling task, and got similar results: the frontally damaged subjects didn't have the feelings necessary for rational action. At some level, the subjects knew "the correct answers." When asked afterward which decks were more dangerous, Elliot pointed (correctly) to the A and B decks. Though he described himself as conservative and riskaverse, he still chose cards from the "bad" decks -even when he repeated the experiment a second time.
Other experiments tested skin responses in frontally damaged subjects who were shown emotionally provocative photos. These subjects' skin showed no emotional response to such stimuli, though when questioned afterward the subjects could describe the pictures as scary, disgusting or sad.
What exactly is going on in these subjects' brains and bodies? Despite a number of possibilities, for now there is no clear answer. The results suggest that something like the somatic-marker hypothesis is correct: emotion and feeling are necessary not just for art and the humanities, but also for rationality. Perhaps Descartes should have listened to his countryman and contemporary Blaise Pascal, who wrote in 1670, "The heart has its own reason that reason does not know at all."
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"The essence of emotion [is] the collection of changes in body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the content of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event." "If you are wondering how bizarre it is that biological drives and emotion may be both benefi cial and pernicious… this would not be the only instance in biology in which a given factor… may be positive or negative according to the circumstances."
